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Some there are who dislike this celestial physics because it contradicts the opinions of Descartes,
and seems hardly to be reconciled with them. Let these enjoy their own opinion, but let them act
fairly,  and  not  deny  the  same  liberty  to  us  which  they  demand  for  themselves.  Since  the
Newtonian Philosophy appears true to us, let us have the liberty to embrace and retain it.1
Published  in  1687,  Isaac  Newton's  Mathematical  Principles  of  Natural  Philosophy
(Principia) sparked a clash between two opposing groups of natural philosophers. On one side
were the Cartesians, or mechanical philosophers, who defended theories derived from Descartes'
work.  On  the  other  stood  the  Newtonians  (which  I  will  also  refer  to  as  mathematical
philosophers),  who defended Newton's  work against  the  claims of  the  Cartesians.  When the
Principia was  published,  the  work  of  Descartes  was  well-established,  and  his  mechanical
theories of the Universe were widely accepted. Newton, however, quickly gathered a number of
followers who passionately defended his work and opposed that of Descartes, creating a schism
in natural philosophy at the turn of the eighteenth century. I will here examine this clash of the
two opposing theories with regards to one specific subject: planetary motion. At the beginning of
the eighteenth century, mechanical and mathematical philosophers formed the two sides of a
scientific controversy, where each proposed ideas that were true within their own framework, but
impossible within the other. This led to them being locked in place in what I call the Descartes-
1 Roger Cotes in Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1966), xxvii.
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Newton paradox: their theories were correct and impossible at the same time, depending on the
framework  one  adopted.  In  order  to  resolve  this  dispute  and  progress  to  the  Newtonian
framework, their methods and philosophies themselves had to be opposed, not the truthfulness of
their  statements. In fact,  I will  argue that the basis  of the controversy lies in the opposition
between  their  background  assumptions  about  the  nature  of  scientific  knowledge  and
explanations. To shed light on this idea, I will proceed in the following manner:
In Chapter 1, I will first  introduce René Descartes and his natural philosophy, mostly
through  his  Principles  of  Philosophy,  and  his  unpublished  manuscript  Le  Monde.  Then,  in
Chapter 2, I will  do the same with Newton, looking at  his  Principia in detail to explain his
conception of planetary motion. In Chapter 3, I introduce some important figures on each side of
the debate: the mechanical philosopher Leibniz, and the Newtonians Cotes and Clarke. I look at
correspondence between them, as well as the preface to the second edition to Principia, in order
to contrast Cartesian and Newtonian philosophies further and see how they directly clashed at the
beginning of the eighteenth century. Chapter 4 details the difference in the methods used by
mechanical and mathematical philosophers, which is a very important step in understanding the
schism  between  them.  With  all  this  important  background  information,  I  adopt  a  Kuhnian
approach in Chapter 5, looking at the ways in which the two frameworks can be considered
incommensurable. Finally, in Chapter 6, I explain why each framework held theories that were
true and impossible at the same time, and how the scientific controversy was resolved, through






René Descartes was a 17th Century French philosopher and mathematician. He was born
on March 31st 1596 in La Haye, Touraine, France. Born into an aristocratic family, he received a
modern Jesuit education, particularly in mathematics and physics, but also in philosophy. After
receiving a degree in Law from the University of Poitiers in 1618, he traveled for some time,
working as a military engineer for the army of Prince Maurice of Nassau. After returning to
France shortly in 1622, he set off to travel across western Europe, visiting many scientists over
the course of seven years, before finally settling in The Netherlands. He lived there for two
decades, before moving to Stockholm in 1949 to be Queen Christina's philosopher. Catching a
severe cold over his first winter there, he died in February of 1950.
From a young age,  starting with his  Jesuit  education,  Descartes'  favorite  subject  was
mathematics. His passion for the discipline remained throughout his life, and is reflected in his
important mathematical works such as the groundbreaking  Geometry (La Géométrie) in 1637.
He founded analytical geometry, inventing such important concepts as the Cartesian coordinate
2 Drawn mostly from:
Charles Coulston Gillispie et al. (eds), Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1971), Volume IV.
"Descartes, René (1596-1650)" In The Hutchinson Dictionary of Scientific Biography (Abington: Helicon, 2015) 
url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hdsb/descartes_rene_1596_1650/0
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system, adequately named after him. Descartes' mathematics were an incredible legacy to science
in general, being applicable to many branches of scientific endeavor. Another important legacy
of his was his particular method and way of reasoning, which underlies much of his work. In
short,  this  method begins  with  a  firm central  theory,  from which  Descartes  derives  detailed
phenomena.  Never  did  he  prefer  to  proceeded  in  the  other  direction,  deriving  theory  from
phenomena. His ultimate goal as a philosopher, and more particularly as a natural philosopher,
was thus to create a system of the world, and to describe its governing principles from which all
phenomena could be derived.
As the French enlightenment author Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle once described,
Descartes “tried in one bold leap to put himself at the source of everything, to make himself
master of the first principles by means of certain clear and fundamental ideas, so that he could
then  simply  descend  to  the  phenomena  of  nature  as  to  necessary  consequences  of  these
principles.”3 This is visible notably in two of his works that went unpublished in his lifetime: Le
Monde, where all phenomena were derived from particular laws of nature and L'Homme, where
the human body was explained using simple fundamental mechanisms. In Le Monde, Descartes
described a world that did not conform to principles put forward by the Church. Galileo having
just been condemned in 1633, Descartes was afraid of the consequences his work may have,
likely explaining why he never published it. One particular text on the system of the Universe,
however, was published in 1644: Principles of Philosophy. Here, Descartes undertook to create a
textbook that  presented  initial  certain premises  and derived from them a full  system of  the
Universe. This was his  most important  work in natural philosophy, and will  be discussed in
detail. The system he put forward became widely accepted, at least in France, and provided a
3 Gillispie, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume IV, 51. Quoting Fontenelle.
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very interesting conception of the Universe. Drawing both from  Le Monde and  Principles of
Philosophy, I will now describe Descartes' Mechanical Universe.
1.2) The Cartesian Mechanical Universe
Descartes  developed  his  model  of  the  Universe  throughout  his  whole  career.  This
culminated  in  Principles  of  Philosophy,  where  this  model  is  fully  explained,  but  Le Monde
already provided  very  interesting  insight  into  his  conception  of  planetary  motion.  In  the
unpublished manuscript, Descartes  constructs a fictional “New World,”4 with all the properties
he wishes to attribute to our own Universe. Using this new world instead of our own was likely
an attempt to avoid prosecution by the Church, though it was not enough for Descartes to go
ahead with the publication. This new world begins in chaos, and Descartes starts by describing
laws that govern it, in order to abolish this chaos.5 In the first of these laws, inspired by Galileo,
Descartes explains that matter will remain at rest, and will not change its shape or size, unless
something collides with it.6 The only way for an object to move, or stop moving, is thus through
a collision with another object. The second law further describes how objects interact:
I suppose as a second rule that, when one of these bodies pushes another, it cannot give the other
any motion except by losing as much of its own at the same time; nor can it take away from the
other body's motion unless its own is increased by as much7
Remaining qualitative, Descartes expresses here a law similar to the conservation of momentum
in collisions. Finally, his third law states that even if an object tends to move in curved lines,
4 René Descartes, Le Monde (New York: Abaris Books, 1979),  chapter 6.




“each  of  its  individual  parts  tends  always  to  continue  its  motion  along  a  straight  line.”8
Throughout  Le Monde, Descartes remains very qualitative in describing the motion of planets,
and does  not describe specifically how distances or different quantities associated with their
motion can be determined. Instead, he provides mechanisms by which the planets move around
the Sun in circular trajectories, but does not give any exact trajectory or way to find it. These
mechanisms for motion are described in great detail in  Principles of Philosophy, which I will
look at more closely.
One of the first pillars of Descartes' natural philosophy is that the existence of empty
space, or vacuum, is impossible.9 He describes space as being similar to a body, in that it extends,
and this extension must according to him contain something; it cannot be empty. The Universe is
thus for Descartes filled with matter, and more specifically a “fluid.”10 What we call a vacuum is
in fact subtle matter, that is imperceptible matter, moving through space. The fact that this subtle
matter travels through space is key to understanding Descartes's view of motion in the Universe.
For him, the heavens (composed of this fluid) “carry all the bodies which they contain.”11 The
planets'  motion  is  then  a  result  of  the  subtle  matter  directly  pushing  them  through  space.
Descartes offers this as further justification for the impossibility of empty space, because there
would then be nothing to push the planets around and direct their motion.12 All planetary motion
is thus the result of planets being carried by the fluids that surround them. Descartes describes
the planets as having no “innate tendency to motion,”13 and in fact continues to describe the
Earth as being “at rest”, because he is considering the frame of reference of the earth. That is, the
8 Ibid,. 71.






Earth may be moving relative to other planets, but in our own reference frame, the Earth remains
at rest. This should not be misunderstood as Descartes describing the Earth as motionless. He is
in fact simply centering his point of view on the Earth, resulting in relative, not absolute, lack of
motion. This may be an example of Descartes being cautious with regards to prevalent religious
principles of the time. As we have seen, the fear of persecution similar to Galileo's was a real
concern of Descartes', and he had to be careful not to put forward ideas the contradicted those of
the Church. Now to account for the circular motion of planets, Descartes describes the heavens
as “revolv[ing] around the Sun like a vortex.”14 The Sun is here the center of a vortex that carries
all the planets around it, as if in a whirlpool of subtle fluid. In addition to this large vortex around
the Sun, there are many smaller vortices around planets that account for the motion of their
moons.15 This superimposition of vortices is what causes the planets to move in the way they do.
All motion results from the direct contact between the subtle matter in these vortices, and the
bodies being pushed around.




The method by which Descartes develops his argument in Principles of Philosophy is key
to understanding his conception of the motion of planets, and of the universe in general. As his
very first step, he starts with doubting everything.16 From there, the only thing that one can be
sure of is one's own existence, because the process of doubting requires one to exist: “That it is
not possible for us to doubt that, while we are doubting, we exist; and that this is the first thing
which we know by philosophizing in the correct order.”17 This leads Descartes to perhaps his
most famous quote: “I think, therefore I am.”18 Because one thinks, one knows one exists. It is
from this first assertion that Descartes then unravels his whole philosophy of human knowledge,
material objects, the Universe, and the Earth. Descartes' thought process is extremely logical, in
that it starts from the only principle that can be known for sure, and derives all the rest of his
philosophical  explanations from this alone.  Therefore,  he attaches a  particular  importance  to
thought itself, as one's own thoughts are the basis for any explanation one may develop. This
idea is developed in pages 6-7, where Descartes explains “How our mind is better known than
the body.”19 Here he describes how our mind is what we know the best, and our own thoughts
form the basis of any understanding of the world. He also puts forward a first argument for the
impossibility  of  empty  space:  “no  properties  or  qualities  belong  to  nothingness;  and  that
accordingly, wherever we perceive some properties or qualities, there we must necessarily find a
thing or substance to which they belong.”20 Furthermore, the perception of anything in the mind
reinforces  the  existence  of  the  mind  itself.  Anytime  one  perceives  something,  whether  this







importance of the mind itself.21 Following this, Descartes does go on to claim that all things that
we perceive “distinctively and clearly” are in fact real.22 This is because God does not attempt to
deceive us, and thus if we perceive something clearly and distinctly we are not mistaken that it
exists.23 This argument relies on his proof of the existence of God, which is not as relevant to my
inquiry here, so I will not go into detail about it. It is vital to note, however, that the mind and
thoughts are at the center of Descartes' philosophy, and that they form the basis for its whole
development.
This importance of thought and the mind plays a vital role in Descartes' conception of
planetary motion.  The first conclusion he draws, which I mentioned in the beginning, is  the
impossibility  of  empty  space.  Placing  thought  at  the  center  of  explanations  makes it  indeed
impossible for Descartes to accept the existence of vacuum. Space is something that is perceived
by our minds, thus it cannot be empty, or void of anything. Then, thinking philosophically about
the motion of objects, Descartes deems it impossible for any motion to take place without direct
influence  from  the  medium,  or  from  another  object  in  direct  contact.  He  states  that  “the
transference is effected  from the vicinity of those bodies contiguous to it in to the vicinity of
others, and not from one place to another.”24 It follows that the only possible way planets in
space  could  move  in  circular  orbits  is  if  something  is  continuously  pushing  them  in  that
direction. Thus, because of the principles Descartes described, the best explanation for him was
that the vortex of subtle matter which I discussed earlier on. Having detailed Descartes' system, I
will now turn to Newton, and his own system of the universe.
21 Ibid., 7.
22 Ibid., 15.
23 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
79.





Isaac Newton was a 17th and 18th century natural philosopher and mathematician. Born on
December  25th 1642  (only  8  years  before  Descartes'  death)  in  Woolsthorpe,  England,  Issac
Newton never knew his father who died before his birth, and was raised by his grandmother from
the age of three after his mother re-married. He was from an early age interested in mechanics,
building clocks, kites and a mouse-powered mill26 among other things. His mother withdrew him
from school when he was 15, but with the help of his uncle and John Stokes, master of the
Grantham school, he returned to prepare for University. In 1661, Newton was admitted to Trinity
College at Cambridge, where he remained for a long period of his life, as a student and then a
professor. As Richard Westfall puts it, “In Cambridge, Newton discovered a new world.”27 The
scientific revolution was well underway at the time, and Newton delved into the works of Kepler,
Descartes and Galileo among others.
25 Drawn mostly from:
Richard Westfall, Never at Rest: A Biography of Isaac Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Charles Coulston Gillispie et al. (eds), Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1971), Volume X.
"Newton, Isaac (1642-1727)" In The Hutchinson Dictionary of Scientific Biography (Abington: Helicon, 2015) 
url=http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/hdsb/newton_isaac_1642_1727/0
26 Gillispie, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume X, 43.
27 Westfall, Never at Rest, 1.
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Upon  obtaining  his  Bachelor's  degree  from  Cambridge,  Newton  spent  time  back  in
Woolsthorpe, from 1665 to 1666, when the University was closed due to the plague. This time he
spent in relative seclusion in his home, with occasional trips to Cambridge, is often regarded as
his “annus mirabilis” (miraculous year), as he “laid the foundations of his work in mathematics,
optics, and astronomy or celestial mechanics.”28 Among other important findings, he obtained
crucial experimental results in optics, diffracting light with a prism, and on the gravitational pull
of the earth using pendulum experiments.
After this, Newton returned to Cambridge as a professor, soon succeeding Isaac Barrow
as the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in 1669. The following year, he started giving short,
sparsely attended weekly lectures, but spent most of his time in his chamber working on his most
important work: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy (Principia), which was to
be one of the most important texts in the history of natural philosophy and science. Finished and
presented to the Royal Society in 1686, it was not immediately published because of a lack of
funding, which was resolved the following year by the contribution of Edmond Halley. After his
publication,  Newton  left  Cambridge  for  London,  where  he  met  Huygens,  Locke,  and  other
eminent philosophers and scientists. A few years later, he left his post as a professor (though not
yet officially), and eventually became the warden of the London mint in 1696. During these
years, Newton did not produce as much scientific work. However, he was elected president of
the Royal Society in 1703, and subsequently published Opticks in 1704, a summary of his work
on light. Opticks was, along with Principia, one of his most important and groundbreaking texts.
He dedicated the last years of his life to revising Principia, and died in London in March of 1727
at the age of 85. Newton's contributions to mathematics, optics, dynamics and astronomy were
28 Gillispie, Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume X, 43.
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revolutionary,  and the  Principia remains one of  the  most  influential  books in  the history of
science, providing mathematical laws and physical principles that are still taught in school today.
2.2) Newton's Mathematical World
In  the  Principia,  Newton  provides  physical  laws  that  govern  our  universe,  and  puts
forward his own system of the universe. To understand more particularly his conception of the
motion of planets, I will thus look in detail at Principia, where he describes it in great detail. The
Principia starts with Newton's famous three laws of Motion. These mathematical laws form the
basis for the physics of motion, not only of planets but of bodies in general. The first law, similar
to that of Descartes, and thus also taken from Galileo, describes the fact that a body will remain
at rest, or in uniform linear motion, unless a force acts upon it: 
Every  body  continues  in  its  state  of  rest,  or  of  uniform  motion  in  a  right  line,  unless  it  is
compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it.29
The second, and perhaps most important one, tells us that the time rate of change in momentum
(what Newton calls “motion”) is proportional to the force that acts upon it:
The change of motion is proportional to the motive force impressed; and is made in the direction
of the right line in which that force is impressed.30
In its equivalent more common modern form, this law second law is the famous F=ma . That
is, the force (or more exactly the total force) impressed upon an object is equal to its mass times
its  acceleration.  This  is  fundamental  in  Newton's  work,  because  it  provides  a  relationship
between force and acceleration, and mathematically defines force. This definition of force, and
29 Newton, Principia, 13.
30 Ibid., 13.
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more  precisely  the  fact  that  it  is  purely  mathematical,  is  a  founding  principle  of  his  work.
Importantly, this equation involves the mass of the object. The acceleration of an object when
subject to a particular force would then according to Newton depend on its mass, which as we
will  later  see is  a  very important  aspect  of Newton's  theory,  that  will  contradict  mechanical
theories. Finally, the third law explains that:
To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual actions of two bodies
upon each other are always equal, and directed to contrary parts.31
This describes collisions between bodies, and the way bodies interact in general, emphasizing
that the action of one body on another is always matched by an equal and opposite reaction.
After  stating  these  three  fundamental  laws,  Newton  gives  a  series  of  mathematical
principles and methods in determining forces.  In fact Newton was the first  to really use the
concept of a force in the way that we understand it  today, and from the beginning, Newton
describes these forces in mathematical terms, as per his definition in the second law. The first
sections of the book are thus a development of mathematical tools to do with centripetal forces,
conic sections, and most importantly orbits. In the development of these tools, Newton begins to
create a mathematical model, where he demonstrates mathematically that the elliptical trajectory
of planets (which Johannes Kepler had previously described) can be obtained if acted on by a
centripetal  force  only.32 At  the  beginning  of  Section  XI,  Newton  clarifies  that  he  describes
centripetal  forces as attractions only in mathematical terms, and does not claim that  there is
action at a distance between objects:
31 Ibid., 13.
32 Ibid., Section VIII.
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But these proportions are to be considered as purely mathematical; and therefore, laying aside all
physical considerations, I make use of a familiar way of speaking, to make myself the more easily
understood by a mathematical reader.33
Here, Newton clarifies his methodology, whereby he is working in mathematics and developing
a model of the motion of bodies without, at least in the first place, consideration for physical
causes.
At the end of this section, Newton explicitly describes what he believes to be the correct
method for explaining natural phenomenon:
In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent
upon any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we compare those proportions
with the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the
several kinds of attractive bodies.34
This order is central to Newton's natural philosophy. First developing a mathematical framework
and set of tools, and only thereafter applying it to physical phenomena. In this way alone can one
be sure that one is correctly explaining the phenomena of Nature.  In the preface to the first
edition of the Principia, Newton described “the whole burden of philosophy”35 to be “from the
phenomena  of  motions  to  investigate  the  forces  of  nature,  and  then  from  these  forces  to
demonstrate the other phenomena.”36 True to this, Newton devotes most of the first volume of
Principia to this mathematical investigation into the forces of nature, and then in the second






model  to  the  real  world,  matching  it  to  observations  of  the  Universe.  The  first  of  his
propositions37 have to do with the motion of the planets and moons in the solar system. For the
planets, he explains that “the forces by which the primary planets are continually drawn off from
rectilinear motions, and retained in their proper orbits, tend to the sun; and are inversely as the
squares of the distances of the places of those planets from the sun's centre.”38 This centripetal
force is thus Newton's explanation for the orbits of all the celestial bodies, even if he has no
physical explanation for it. That is, Newton does not in Principia attempt to give physical causes
for  these forces,  but  merely describes  them quantitatively.  Furthermore,  Newton describes  a
“power of gravity pertaining to all bodies, proportional to the several quantities of matter which
they contain.”39 This is another example of a phenomenon which is mathematically described
without any underlying physical explanation. This is the result of Newton's explicit methodology
in explaining natural phenomena, but also of his conception of physical explanations, which for
him do not, at least in the first place, require a philosophical understanding.
Figure 2: Newton's elliptical orbit resulting from a centripetal





Another reason for this lack of physical or philosophical understanding is that Newton
did not want his work to be speculative. In the “General Scholium” Newton famously explained
that he “frame[s] no hypotheses”:
I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity form phenomena, and I
frame  no  hypotheses;  for  whatever  is  not  deduced  from  the  phenomena  is  to  be  called  an
hypothesis;  and hypotheses,  whether  metaphysical  or  physical,  whether of  occult  qualities  or
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy particular propositions
are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction.40 
Newton cannot derive a cause for gravity from observation or experimentation, and thus does not
provide one, as it would be the result of speculation. This will be later detailed in chapter 4 when
comparing  the  methods  of  Descartes  and  Newton,  but  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  in
understanding Newton's philosophy as a whole.
One last important issue Newton approaches, notably in the General Scholium as well, is
that of empty space. in fact, he provides a strong argument to undermine the possibility of the
existence of a fluid to fill space. Indeed, the motion of the planets perfectly matches that caused
by centripetal force alone, and the existence of this fluid is problematic to Newton's theory, in
that it would create a resistance similar to that of the air on projectiles in our atmosphere. This
resistance would have an impact on the motion of planets and comets, which could no longer
move freely through space. In order for Newton's mathematical model to work, there can be no
resistance to hinder the planets' motions. Having detailed Newton's system, I will now look at the




REACTIONS TO NEWTON'S WORK:
INTRODUCING LEIBNIZ, COTES AND CLARKE
3.1) Leibniz's Response to Newton's Principia
In order to understand the reaction Cartesians had to Newton's Principia, and the nature
of the disagreement between mechanical philosophers and mathematical philosophers, I will look
particularly  at  one  key player  in  the  controversy: Gottfried  Wilhelm Leibniz.  Like  Newton,
Leibniz was a creative mathematician and one of the greatest minds of the 17 th and 18th centuries.
His works in mathematics, logic and philosophy were in fact among the most important of that
time period41. He was born in Leipzig, Germany, on July 1st 1646, less than 4 years after Newton.
A brilliant student from an early age, he entered the University of Leipzig when he was just 15.
After his university education,  Leibniz moved to Paris  where he was mentored by Christian
Huygens in mathematics, physics and philosophy, and very importantly influenced by the works
of Descartes in philosophy and Pascal in mathematics among others.
Though  Leibniz  came  to  disagree  with  many  aspects  of  Descartes'  theories,  his
mechanical  philosophical  framework remained present  in  all  of  Leibniz's  work on planetary
motion.  Leibniz  was  very  mathematically  gifted,  and  in  fact  developed  his  own  calculus
41 Biographical details taken from:
Charles Coulston Gillispie et al. (eds), Dictionary of Scientific Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1971), Volume VIII.
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independently of Newton, approximately ten years later (he was the first to publish it, so Newton
and Leibniz  argued for  priority  over  this  invention,  but  evidence  from original  manuscripts
points to them both devising their own calculus independently42). Unlike Descartes' descriptions
of our Universe, which remained almost purely qualitative, Leibniz's were very mathematical,
and  attempted  to  explain  the  motion  of  planets  in  quantitative  terms.  However,  his  model
remained, like that of Descartes, based on the existence of a subtle fluid to carry the planets
around. As Domenico Bertoloni puts it in Equivalence and Priority:
The introduction of vortices in connection with the mathematical formalism represents a new and
crucial  stage,  and  will  remain  a  characteristic  feature  of  Leibniz's  attempts.  […]  He  also
conceived orbital motion as the resultant of a circular motion due to a vortex rotating with a
velocity inversely proportional to the centre, composed with a rectilinear radial motion due to
gravity.43
This notion of a vortex rotating with velocity inversely proportional to the centre may pose a
problem as to the velocity of the object at the center here, but what is more interesting is the way
Leibniz  adds a  quantitative side to  a  formerly  purely  qualitative theory of  vortices.  That  is,
Leibniz gives it mathematical foundations, and uses a method more similar to that of Newton in
that he develops mathematical proofs for all his claims about the motion of planets. This bridge
between Cartesian ethereal theories and Newton's mathematical work is very interesting, because
it puts Leibniz in the perfect position to respond to Newton's work. He proposes a mechanical
theory similar to that of Descartes, but grounds it in mathematics, making it more comparable to
Newtonian theories.
42 Domenico Bertoloni Meli, Equivalence and Priority: Newton versus Leibniz (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1993), 1.
43 Ibid., 113
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Leibniz certainly admired many aspects of Newton's work, notably his mathematics and
the wealth of results he produced. In fact, by looking at Leibniz's personal notes on his own copy
of Newton's  Principia, it appears that he attempted to apply the mathematics he developed to
many of Newton's propositions, to try to see if his own work could coincide with Newton's.
Looking at Leibniz's notes on and about  Principia, it appears that he took many of Newton's
lemmas and tried to prove them using concepts that he has already proven. Bertoloni claims that
this was in order to claim originality for his work on planetary motion in Tentamen, notably in
his explanation for Kepler's  area law (which describes the movement of planets in elliptical
orbits):
The surprising identity between curves described with rectilinear uniform motion and the action
of gravity or levity, and curves described by a body pushed by a vortex rotating with a velocity
inversely  proportional  to  the  distance  from  the  centre,  allows  Leibniz  to  make  the  crucial
transition from Newton's central forces as an explanation for the area law, to vortical motion. This
metamorphosis allowed Leibniz to raise the profile of his interpretation by presenting it not as a
modification of Newton's theory, but as the result of an independent discovery dating from several
years earlier.  Needless to say, the move from central attraction to vortical motion is carefully
concealed in the  Tentamen; Leibniz's claim to originality is based on his demonstrations of the
area law and inverse-square law being different from Newton's.44
This  claim  is  backed  by  calculations  appearing  in  unpublished  Leibniz  manuscripts  where
Newton's laws are transformed into his own. While this goes to show that Newton exerted an
important influence on Leibniz, Bertoloni's claim should be taken carefully. Rather than to claim
originality, this could simply be because Leibniz saw Newton's results as correct, but disagreed
44 Ibid., 116.
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with his method and theories. Leibniz applying his own methods to obtain the same results could
thus have been an effort to prove Newton's results which he deemed correct without requiring
Newton's derivation and theories which he regarded as false. Regardless of his exact motivations,
this  demonstrates  Leibniz's  great  mathematical  ability,  and  the  quality  of  his  work  to
mathematize mechanical theories of the Universe.
At the beginning of the 18th century,  a real controversy between Newton and Leibniz
began. Their argument started with the issue of priority over the invention of calculus,45 and dealt
at first mostly with mathematical disagreements. As we have seen, however, mathematics was
closely  linked  with  mechanics  for  both  men.  This  led  the  controversy  to  quickly  evolve,
encompassing a variety of subjects including of course their views on planetary motion.46 This
evolution from mathematics to other subjects took a certain amount of time, and it was not until
1710  that  the  controversy  on  planetary  motion  openly  started,  when  Leibniz  published  his
Theodicy. Here, he directly and openly criticized “the admirable Mr. Newton” for his notion of
gravity, because it appeared to him as the result of action at a distance:
It  is  true  that  modern  philosophers  for  some  time  now  have  denied  the  immediate  natural
operation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I am of their opinion.
Meanwhile remote operation has just been revived in England by the admirable Mr. Newton, who
maintains that it  is the nature of bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another,  in
proportion to the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives.47
Leibniz explains that he sides with philosophers who consider it impossible for bodies to act
45 The following is taken from:
Samuel Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956).
46 Bertoloni Meli, Equivalence and Priority, Chapter 4.
47 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy (Chicago: Open Court, 1985), 85-86.
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upon each other if there is any distance between them. This can simply be interpreted as Leibniz
explaining that he agrees with mechanical philosophers,  who embrace this  as a fundamental
principle of physics. In fact, he explains that this as a widely accepted position, and that Newton
is attempting to bring back the long invalidated idea of action at a distance between objects, even
claiming that it is proportional to mass. This is a legitimate claim, as mechanical theories were in
fact relatively widespread at the time. However, it is difficult to see exactly what he means by
“rays of attraction,” as Newton does not seem to make any mention of these rays (this may have
been Leibniz attributing the physical form of a ray to Newton's mathematical concept of force).
A year later, in 1711, Leibniz followed up on this criticism, this time indirectly, in a letter to
Hartsoeker which was published in Memoirs of Literature in 1712.48 First, Leibniz claims that “if
any one should say, it is God's will that a planet should move round in its orbit, without any other
cause of its motion, I maintain , that it would be a perpetual miracle.”49 This is a first example of
Leibniz invoking religion and God as a rhetorical  tool  in  his  argument  with Newton. While
Leibniz and Newton's theories of planetary motion make no direct mention of God, they both
employ theological  arguments  when  criticizing  the  other's  views.  Further  in  the  same letter,
another recurring criticism of Newton's theory of gravity employed by Leibniz appears. Leibniz
accuses Newton of reintroducing “occult qualities” with his notion of gravity: 
the ancients and the moderns, who own that gravity is an occult quality, are in the right, if they
mean by this that there is a certain mechanism unknown to them, whereby all bodies tend towards
the center of the earth. But if they mean that the thing is performed without any mechanism by a
simple  primitive  quality,  or  by  a  law  of  God,  who  produces  that  effect  without  using  any
48 Samuel Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956),  x.
49 Isaac Newton, Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 111.
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intelligible means, it is an unreasonable occult quality50
Here, Leibniz thus claims that unless Newton can give an explanation for the cause of gravity, he
must be considering it an occult quality.
This is a strong attack on Newton, as the term “occult” invokes an old and thoroughly
discredited tradition, particularly important in renaissance magic. Occult qualities were “inherent
powers” that objects possessed, and hidden forces in nature, which could if revealed unearth
great powers and magic, according to renaissance occult philosophers such as Cornelius Agrippa.
The  powers  associated  with  the  occult  qualities  were  immense,  as  Agrippa  explains  in  De
Occulta Philosophia:
But this is true, this is sublime, but Occult Philosophy; to understand the mysterious influences of
the intellectual world upon the Celestial, and of both upon the Terrestrial; and to know how to
dispose, and to fit ourselves so, as to be capable of receiving those superior operations, whereby
we may be able to operate wonderful things, which indeed seem impossible, or at least unlawful,
when as indeed they may be affected by a natural power, and without either offense to God, or
violation of Religion. […] To increase riches, to procure the favor of men, to expell diseases, to
preserve health, to prolong life, to renew youth, to foretell future events, to see and know things
many miles off51
From this extract,  it  is immediately visible why by Leibniz's time, this had been completely
rejected (notably as heresy) because of the magical nature of the theory.  Referring to occult
qualities is thus a strong claim, and it will be useful to understand the term's background, as both
Cartesians and Newtonians employ it repeatedly in attempts to discredit opposing theories.
50 Ibid., 112.
51 Cornelius Agrippa, De Occulta Philosophia (London: R.W., 1651), Introduction.
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Leibniz's Cartesian influence really appears through his accusations. It is inconceivable
for Leibniz to consider Newton's explanation legitimate without a consideration for the causes of
gravity. Leibniz disagrees with some of Newton's claims, but further than this, he sees a gap in
his explanation, as a direct cause for gravity is not provided. However, Newton read this letter in
Memoirs of Literature in 1712, and responded to the editors defending his claims on the basis
that  everything  he  put  forward  has  been  proven  mathematically.52 To  see  how  Newtonians
responded to these Cartesian attacks, I will now move on chronologically to the following year,
when the second edition of Newton's Principia was published.
3.2) Newtonians Retort: Cotes' Preface
More than  25 years  after  the first  edition,  Newton published a second edition of the
Principia in 1713, which included some new material, as well as a few corrections and additions
to some of his claims and proofs. More importantly to us, however, is the preface to the second
edition, which was written by Roger Cotes, a fervent follower of Newton's. Cotes, like Newton,
attended  Trinity  College  at  Cambridge  University  and  was  an  astronomer  and  brilliant
mathematician.53 Newton thought highly of him, and eventually asked him for help in preparing
the second edition of the Principia. Cotes became an integral part of this effort, and was a source
of  motivation  to  Newton.  The  two men agreed that  Cotes  would write  a  preface  defending
Newtonian “experimental philosophy” against that of the Cartesians. If only a preface to the
book, its importance should not be underestimated, as it sets the tone for the whole text, sticking
in the minds of the readers as they interpret the following sections. In fact, the tone employed in
Cotes' preface seems quite different to that employed by Newton, which could be a direct result
52 Ibid., 115.
53 Biographical details taken from Gillispie et al. (eds), Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume III.
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of Leibniz's attacks of the previous years. While Newton's work focuses on the development of
its  own  concepts  and  does  not  particularly  examine  opposing  claims,  Cotes  quite  bitterly
responds to criticism of Newton's work, and defends its conclusions against that of Leibniz and
mechanical philosophers (though he does not directly refer to them).
In arguing this, cotes proceeds in the following manner. He begins by separating natural
philosophers into “three classes.”54 First, the ancients such as Aristotle who assigned properties
to matter without, he claims, much explanation, and who thus only introduced a “philosophical
way of  speaking”.  The second category is  where  Descartes  and Leibniz  come in,  and more
generally  mechanical  philosophers.  He  describes  them  as  rejecting  the  “useless  medley  of
words”  employed  by  those  from the  first  category,  and  then  “assum[ing]  that  all  matter  is
homogenous, and that the variety of norms which is seen in bodies arises from very plain and
simple relations of the component particles.”55 In other words, these philosophers start from a
basic set of rules and ways in which particles interact, and then derive their theory of nature
following  these  rules.  Cotes  then  puts  forward  his  central  argument  against  mechanical
philosophers:
By going on from simple things to those which are more compounded they certainly proceed
right, if they attribute to those primary relations no other relations than those which Nature has
given. But when they take a liberty of imagining at pleasure unknown figures and magnitudes,
and uncertain situations and motions of the parts, and moreover of supposing occult fluids […]
they run out into dreams and chimeras, and neglect the true constitution of things, which certainly
is  not  to  be derived from fallacious conjectures  […].  Those who assume hypotheses as  first
54 Newton, Principia, xx.
55 Ibid., xx.
25
principles of their speculations, although they afterwards proceed with the greatest accuracy from
those principles, may indeed form an ingenious romance, but a romance it will still be.”56
Cotes'  claim is  thus  that  even if  the  logic  with  which  mechanical  philosophers  derive  their
description  of  nature  is  flawless,  the  universe  they  construct  is  a  mere  fantasy  because  the
foundations  upon  which  their  argument  is  constructed  are  mere  invention.  Indeed,  the
foundations that Cotes is referring to, the “uncertain situations and motion of the parts, ” and the
“occult fluids,” are a direct reference to the founding principles of the mechanical philosophers'
Universe. He deems these foundations to be the result of speculation, rather than experiment or
observation, and thus the whole argument crumbles, even if the logic used thereafter is valid. An
interesting aspect of the debate also appears here, as Cotes uses the term “occult” to describe the
subtle fluids that fill the mechanical philosophers' Universe. Leibniz had earlier called Newton's
gravity an “occult quality,” and now Cotes is in turn accusing Cartesians of using “occult” fluids.
There is an important discrepancy in the way the term occult is used. Leibniz meant occult in the
sense of lacking cause, claiming that gravity was an occult quality because it had no mechanical
mechanism, and Newton did not explain how it acted. On the other hand, Cotes here refers to the
subtle fluid as occult, because there is no evidence that it exists, it is not visible nor tangible, and
he  simply  deems  it  a  speculative  construction  by  Cartesian  philosophers.  Each  side  of  the
controversy is thus accusing the other of employing occult  qualities, but this means different
things  in  each  context.  This  is  a  very  interesting  characteristic  of  this  debate,  and  will  be
examined in more detail in chapter when discussing incommensurability.
Finally, the third and best “class” of philosophy, as expected, is the branch of philosophy
to which both he and Newton belong: “experimental philosophy”. The difference, as Cotes sees
56 Ibid., xx.
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it, between them and the previous category, is that “they assume nothing as a principle, that is not
proved by phenomena. They frame no hypotheses, nor receive them into philosophy otherwise
than as questions whose truth may be disputed.”57 The method is then “synthetical and analytical.
From some select phenomena they deduce by analysis the forces of Nature and the more simple
laws of forces; and from thence by synthesis show the constitution of the rest.”58 Of course,
Cotes  finds  this  to  be  by  far  the  best  of  the  three  classes,  and  goes  on  to  praise  Newton
unequivocally for his beautiful example of this kind of argument: “This is that incomparably best
way of philosophizing, which our renowned author most justly embraced in preference to the
rest, and thought alone worthy to be cultivated and adorned by his excellent labors.”59
Then, Cotes goes on to explain that all the principles upon which Newton's theory of
gravity relies have been proven, taking them one by one. This leads him to claim that there can
be no denying that Newton is correct. Cotes goes as far as to claim that “either gravity must have
a place among the primary qualities of all  bodies, or extension, mobility, and impenetrability
must  not.”60 By  his  conclusion,  gravity  must  then  be  considered  along  these  other  primary
qualities of all bodies. In fact, he refutes arguments put forward by Leibniz about gravity being
an occult quality:
Some I  know disapprove  this  conclusion,  and  mutter  something about  occult  qualities.  They
continually are cavilling with us, that gravity is an occult property, and occult causes are to be
quite banished from philosophy. But to this the answer is easy: that those are indeed occult causes






demonstrated by observations. Therefore gravity can by no means be called an occult cause of the
celestial motions, because it is plain from the phenomena that such a power does really exist.
Those rather have recourse to occult  causes,  who set  imaginary vortices  of a matter  entirely
fictitious and imperceptible by our senses, to direct those motions.”61
Here, Cotes not only defends gravity against claims put forward by mechanical philosophers, but
counters and claims that they are guilty of the very thing they are accusing Newton of doing, that
they are the ones using occult causes. Again, we see the disparity in their perception of occult
qualities as a central part of their argument. Following this, Cotes goes on to provide a series of
arguments against the existence of vortices, and on top of proving Newtonian philosophers are
correct, Cotes attempts to disprove any opposing claims. Finally, the preface ends with profuse
praise of Newton, and assurance that the method used is without doubt the best in order to arrive
at the truth about gravity and the motion of planets.
Before moving on, I believe it is important at this point to note that Cotes and Newton
may not completely agree on some of the terms of this preface. While Cotes repeatedly claims
that gravity is a primary quality of objects, just like extension or impenetrability, Newton seems
more  reserved  about  this  sort  of  claim.  Newton  trusted  Cotes  with  this  preface,  as  they
collaborated closely on the second edition,  but while  he provided a strong argument for the
Newtonian way of philosophizing, the perspective that Cotes brings here may have been slightly
different from that of Newton. As we saw briefly in Chapter 1, and will go into more detail about
in the next chapters, Newton is very careful about assigning any physical attributes to the force
of attraction he describes. While he does believe there is an attraction towards the center of all
bodies  that  follows an inverse-square  law,  he  never  claims  it  to  be  an intrinsic  property of
61 Ibid., xxvi-xxvii.
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objects, and as we will briefly look at, even delves into theories similar to that of Descartes and
Leibniz in his famous Queries at the end of Opticks. Having examined the Newtonian response
under Cartesian fire, I will finish this chapter with the final exchanges of the Newton-Leibniz
controversy:  the  correspondence  between  Leibniz  and  Clarke,  and  the  brief  Conti
Correspondence.
3.3) The Leibniz-Clarke and Conti Correspondence: a Final Argument
 Samuel  Clarke  was  a  British,  17-18th century  natural  philosopher  and  theologian62.
Although he was influenced both by Descartes and Newton, Clarke sided strongly with Newton
when it came to physical matters. In 1706, Newton asked Clarke to translate his  Opticks into
latin, and was very impressed by the resulting work, which may have been the reason Newton
placed his trust in Clarke to interpret and defend his theories. Throughout his life, Clarke was
indeed a strong defender of Newton's work, particularly in debates with Cartesians, as we will
see in his correspondence with Leibniz. To understand why the debate between the two men
started, we must go to 1714. In that year, Clarke developed a friendship with Princess Caroline of
Wales, whom he mentored. She was also a friend of Leibniz's, and asked Clarke to translate
Leibniz's Theodicy. However, Clarke refused because of the attack on Newton's that was present
in the book (which we saw in chapter 3.1). Clarke sent a letter explaining this to Caroline, who
subsequently showed it to Leibniz, sparking the controversy between the two men. At the end of
1715, Leibniz and Clarke began their exchange, which would amount to a total of ten letters (five
rounds of back and forth). In these letters, sent through the intermediary of the princess, they
opposed Newtonian and Cartesian physics. The themes involved ranged from religion and God
to gravity, vacuum, space and time. It is uncertain what the extent of Newton's role in Clarke's
62 Biographical details taken from Gillispie et al. (eds), Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume III.
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letters was, but what is certain is that Newton was aware Clarke was writing these letters to
Leibniz,63 and it seems that Clarke did ask for Newton's advice according to letters written by
Caroline.64 Some have gone so far as to claim Newton was writing these letters for Clarke, but
there is no direct evidence to back these claims. Either way, Clarke's philosophy was very close
to that of Newton regarding the matters at hand, and he was in a perfect position to provide
arguments for Newton's ideas which Newton would without doubt have endorsed.
The exchange between the two men lasted from November 1715 to October 1716, two
weeks before Leibniz's death65. Leibniz wrote the first of these letters in November 1715, with
Clarke replying shortly thereafter. This first exchange was short, and dealt only with religion,
God and the soul. This had little to do with planetary motion, so it will not be considered at
length here. However, it is important in that it sparked the debate between the two men, with
Clarke using Newton's notions to refute Leibniz's claims. In fact, as I have previously mentioned,
religion was central in the debate itself. Leibniz repeatedly attacked Newton on his conception of
God, and the role God had within his framework. Newtonians defended their conception of the
Universe  against  these  claims,  and  similarly  attacked  mechanical  philosophers  for  the
implications of their theory as to God's position. This is a fascinating debate, and does add to the
disagreement  and  animosity  between  Newtonians  and  Cartesians.  Religion  played  a  very
important role in the lives of every party involved, and it  is thus natural that they employed
religious  arguments  as  one  of  their  rhetorical  tools  to  attempt  to  disprove  each  other.  For
example, in the second round of exchanges between the two men, Leibniz puts forward a first
problem that  he  sees  with  the  existence  of  vacuum (which  is  integral  to  Newton's  theory).
63 Rupert Hall, Philosophers at War: The Quarrel Between Newton and Leibniz (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1980), 219.
64 Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, xii.
65 All that follows is based on Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 1956.
30
According to him, “the more matter there is, the more God has occasion to exercise his wisdom
and power. Which is one reason, among others, why I maintain that there is no vacuum at all.” 66
Thus, the existence of vacuum would, for Leibniz, mean that God is not completely perfect,
hence his rejection of it. Clarke responds to this by claiming that even if the quantity of matter in
the universe is very small in comparison to the extent of vacuum, this does not diminish God's
power, as God “exercises his power and wisdom” equally on all things.67 I will not delve into it at
length here, and instead focus on claims directly related to planetary motion which I believe
reveal  a  deeper  divide  in  the  frameworks  proposed  by  mechanical  and  mathematical
philosophers. However, I think it is important to point out that it was a significant aspect of the
controversy.
At the end of his third letter, Leibniz reiterates the claim he had made in the past about
gravity, namely that “the attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous thing, since it
cannot  be  explained  by the  nature  of  bodies.”68 Leibniz  is  thus  claiming that  there are  two
possibilities  for  attraction:  either  it  is  a  “perpetual  miracle”  as  he  described in  his  letter  to
Hartsoeker in 1712,69 or it would have to be a property of the body itself, in other words an
occult quality.70 Clarke responds by claiming that Leibniz's “notion of a miracle is erroneous.”71
He maintains that the motion of bodies around a centre cannot be called a miracle if it is not an
unusual occurrence, regardless of whether or not it is the direct action of God. Only if the action
were uncommon or extraordinary could it  be called a miracle,  otherwise many other natural
66 Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 16.
67 Ibid., 21.
68 Ibid., 30.
69 Newton, Philosophical Writings, 111.
70 Clarke, The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, xviii.
71 Ibid., 35.
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phenomena should equally be called miracles.72
In his fourth letter, Leibniz goes into more detail about gravity, but first puts forward
another claim about the impossibility of a vacuum. For him, “If space is a property or attribute, it
must be the property of some substance. But what substance will that bounded empty space be an
affection  or  property  of,  which  the  persons I  am arguing with,  suppose  to  be  between two
bodies?”73 Leibniz cannot fathom the idea of vacuum. Similarly to Descartes, he believes that
space would need to be the property of something and cannot simply be nothing. There must thus
be a substance to fill the void. Clarke responds to this by explaining that “Space void of body, is
the property of an incorporeal substance,”74 and that space is everywhere within and outside
particles. Furthermore, he denies Leibniz's objection by explaining that void space is indeed not
completely empty, merely that it is “void of body only. In all void space, God is certainly present,
and possibly many other substances which are not matter; being neither tangible, not objects of
any of our senses.”75 This argument is significant because it denies the possibility of a subtle
fluid in  space in  Leibniz's  own terms, as space would indeed be the property of something,
simply not of anything material.
In  the  same letter,  Leibniz  had also reiterated  his  claim that  gravity as  described by
Newton is impossible. He claims that it is simply impossible that bodies act upon each other
from a distance, “without any intermediate means.”76 Here, Clarke has a brilliant response, where
he confirms what Leibniz says, that it would indeed be impossible, but that it is not what Newton







merely that this interaction is invisible to us, and is not mechanical.77 This is a very important
point,  because  Leibniz  never  understood  the  point  of  view  of  Newtonians  on  gravity,  and
continued  to  criticize  it  as  an  occult  quality,  even  when  he  misunderstood  the  nature  they
attributed to it. Whereas in his preface Cotes slightly misinterpreted Newton's view of gravity,
Clarke  more  appropriately  describes  it  here.  While  Cotes'  notion  of  gravity  was  subject  to
Leibniz's criticism because it really did act “without any intermediate means,”78 Clarke departs
from this idea and complicates the notion of interaction, introducing an interaction through non-
mechanical  means.  This  interaction  is  not  simply  a  collision  between  bodies,  but  another,
different kind of interaction.
The fifth and final round of letters is significantly longer than the previous batches, with
both authors attempting to clarify their own points as well as disprove the other's as best they
can. Leibniz's final letter is very interesting in that it shows that up until the very end of his life
he simply could never see eye to eye with Newtonians on matters of vacuum or gravity. He and
Clarke are approaching the problem from completely different conceptual frameworks, so once
again Leibniz denies the existence of vacuum, and is very clear about his stance with regards to
Newton's gravity:
The author answers here, that an attraction without any means intervening, would be indeed a
contradiction. Very well! But then what does he mean, when he will have the sun to attract the
globe of the earth through an empty space? Is it God himself that performs it? But this would be a
miracle, if ever there was any. […] Or, are perhaps some immaterial substances, or some spiritual




performed? Of which sort of things, the author seems to have still  a good stock in his head,
without explaining himself sufficiently.
120. That means of communication (says he) is invisible, intangible, not mechanical. He
might as well have added inexplicable, unintelligible, precarious, groundless, and unexampled.79
It is obvious from this passage that Leibniz does not think Clarke is explaining anything, and that
what he is claiming is impossible.  Interaction can only be mechanical for Leibniz, as it  is a
founding principle of mechanical philosophy, and Clarke's non-mechanical interaction does not
satisfy Leibniz in the least. In his response to this, Clarke will simply state the fact that attraction
proportional to the masses of planets through empty space is an experimentally proved fact, and
thus irrefutable. We start to see an important divide in their philosophies. It does not matter to
Clarke that it is not mechanical, in fact, it does not even matter to him whether or not there is a
direct cause for gravity. As long as it is experimentally and mathematically proven, it must be
true. Clarke does concede that philosophers may find a cause for this attraction, mechanical or
not. However, he follows up with the very interesting rhetorical question: “But if they cannot
discover the cause; is therefore the effect itself, the phenomenon, or the matter of fact discovered
by experience, (which is all that is meant by the words attraction and gravitation,) ever the less
true?”80 The approach of both philosophers is simply too different. Had they argued for ten more
years, the outcome would in all likelihood have been the same: they could never agree.
To conclude this chapter, I wish to mention briefly the only direct epistolary exchange
between Newton and Leibniz during their controversy, which occurred between November 1715





laid out many of the same problems he expressed to Clarke, notably that Newtonian gravity must
be either a perpetual miracle or an occult quality. He goes on to criticize Newton's methods, and
claims he is not following his own teachings, as he is not drawing conclusions from experiments
but conjecturing from his results.82 This may have been because according to Leibniz, Newton's
data is not sufficient to prove what he is claiming. It is difficult to say why exactly Leibniz
believed this, as he does not provide much further detail. Regardless, Newton's response is short
and quite acrimonious. He sharply criticizes Leibniz's overall philosophy, and even his attitude
towards him. The dialog ends with an equally short response for Leibniz, who briefly defends his
view, but ends the dialog, as both men will clearly never agree on the matters at hand, and seem
to have given up on convincing the other party. Why was their disagreement so fundamental?
Why would two such brilliant minds never reach an agreement on any of these subjects? A first
step in better understanding their disagreement is to analyze the difference between Cartesian
and Newtonian methods. To contrast these methods and ways of philosophizing, I will look in
more  detail  at  the  construction  of  the  texts  which  constitute  the  pillars  of  the  controversy:
Descartes's Principles of Philosophy and Newton's Principia.




DIFFERENT METHODS AND FRAMEWORKS
4.1) Starting Points
In comparing the methods of Cartesians and Newtonians, it is indeed useful to look at the
structure  of  these  two  pivotal  works  (Principles  of  Philosophy and  Principia)  and  the
philosophical methods that they seem to reveal. The first and perhaps most important difference
in the works of Descartes and Newton is the basis, or foundation, of their argument. As we saw
in the first chapter, in the case of Descartes, this starting point is very simply that the only thing
one can be certain about is the existence of one's own mind and thoughts.83 Descartes guides us
through a process of doubting all things, until the only thing we can be certain exists is our own
thoughts. Then, through proving the existence of God, and claiming that “God is not the source
of errors,”84 Descartes removes all these doubts, and explains that all things that are “clearly and
distinctly  perceived”85 must  be real  and true.  This is  a  very interesting approach,  because it
means that the prerequisite for anything to be real is to have clear and distinct properties. As
Stephen Gaukroger explains in his book Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy, this creates a
dynamic by which properties of objects must be known before the object itself is known:
83 Descartes, Principles, 4-5.
84 Ibid., 15. 
85 Ibid., 15.
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What in article 30 removes 'the doubts previously listed' is the application of the doctrine of clear
and  distinct  ideas.  This  is  the  doctrine  that  generates  the  basic  features  of  Descartes'
epistemologically driven metaphysical programme, and what is distinctive and novel about it is
that it reverses the traditional procedure whereby, when we inquire into the nature of something,
we first establish its existence and then ask what properties or features it has. Descartes' use of the
principle of clear and distinct ideas forces us to proceed in the opposite direction. We can only ask
whether something exists once we have a clear and distinct conception of what it is that we are
asking about, for only then do we have a proper grasp of the problem. Consequently, we must ask
about the nature of something before we can proceed to ask whether something having that nature
exists.86
This notion is  important,  because  it  is  vital  to  Descartes'  reasoning, and will  have  very big
implications in his work, and thus on mechanical philosophy in general. For example, this is part
of Descartes' justification for the impossibility of vacuum, because we assign clear and distinct
properties to space, and thus it cannot be empty, there must be something there to hold these
properties.
Newton's way of proceeding is, however, quite different. As we saw in the first chapter,
Newton's experimental philosophy (as Cotes called it in his preface to the second edition of the
Principia)  uses  mathematics  as  a  foundation.  Completing  a  quote  from  chapter  1,  Newton
himself put it this way:
In mathematics we are to investigate the quantities of forces with their proportions consequent
upon any conditions supposed; then, when we enter upon physics, we compare those proportions
86 Gaukroger, Descartes' System of Natural Philosophy, 69.
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with the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the
several  kinds  of  attractive  bodies.  And  this  preparation  being  made,  we  argue  more  safely
concerning the physical species, causes and proportions of the forces.87
This very structure is what Newton aims to achieve with his own work. The initial emphasis is
placed  on  developing  a  mathematical  framework  for  the  phenomena,  which  will  then  be
measured against observations seen in nature. Because of the precise mathematical description of
forces, the corresponding physical phenomena will then be much more readily explained, if one
is able to create this mathematical framework. As we have seen, the first book of the Principia is
specifically  meant  to  develop  this  very  mathematical  framework  which  will  provide  strong
evidence for physical claims further on. This is precisely what Newton sought in creating it and
in proceeding in this order. The difference in the basis of Descartes and Newton's arguments will
shed interesting light on the rest of their work, notably in the laws they both put forward later in
the texts we are here analyzing.
4.2) Laws of Nature and Laws of Motion
After laying their foundation, the two philosophers' arguments follow different structures.
From his own metaphysical groundwork, Descartes will build his way up, starting in second part
of Principles of Philosophy with: “The reasons why we know with certainty that material objects
exist.”88 Following  this  demonstration,  Descartes  describes  the  nature  of  objects,  space,  and
motion as he conceives them, again by building up on what he has previously explained. Then,
however, Descartes joins Newton in stating three fundamental laws, which he calls the “Laws of
Nature.”  These  are  very  similar  to  those  he provided earlier  in  Le Monde,  dealing  with  the
87 Newton, Principia, 192.
88 Descartes, Principles, 39.
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motion and collisions of bodies. Very interestingly, however, the two first laws combined closely
resemble Newton's first law of motion, itself the starting point of Newton's Principia. Descartes'
first two laws are the following:
The first law of nature: that each thing, as far as is in its power, always remains in the same state;
and that consequently, when it is once moved, it always continues to move.
[...]
The second law of nature: that all movement is, of itself, along straight lines; and consequently,
bodies which are moving in a circle always tend to move away from the center of the circle which
they are describing.89
To facilitate the comparison, here is Newton's first law again: “Every body continues in its state
of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces
impressed upon it.”90 At first glance, these two laws are indeed very similar, and taken on their
own, they express almost the same thing. However, in order to fully understand each of their
laws, one must look further into the explanations provided by both authors, and more generally
at  their  philosophies.  This  is  very  important,  because  these  laws  are  central  to  both  men's
understanding of the Universe, and to their respective frameworks.
The first thing to notice is that there is a difference in the wording of the laws. While
Descartes talks about objects being “moved”, Newton uses the notion of “forces impressed upon
it.” These may seem to be a trivial difference, but when looking at the explanations of each of
them following the statement of the law, it becomes clear that they have different notions of what
can move the objects. Descartes explains that objects will only change “by external causes.”91 In
89 Ibid., 60.
90 Newton, Principia, 13.
91 Descartes, Principles, 69.
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itself, this statement does not say much, but later in his clarification of the first law, Descartes
makes it clear what exactly he means by these external causes. Talking about objects thrown into
the air, Descartes explains that:
There is no other reason why things which have been thrown should continue to move for some
time after they have left the hand which threw them except that, {in accordance with the laws of
nature},  having once begun to move,  they continue to do so until  they are  slowed down by
encounter with other bodies. It is obvious, moreover, that they are always gradually slowed down,
either by the air itself or by some other fluid bodies through which they are moving, and that, as a
result, their movement cannot last for long.92
Descartes thus makes it very clear that any change in motion is brought upon an object by an
“encounter with other bodies,” and nothing else. By contrast, Newton's explanations following
his first law states that “Projectiles continue in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by
the resistance of the air, or impelled downwards by the force of gravity.”93 Whereas Descartes
would agree with Newton when it comes to the resistance of air,  the fundamental difference
between Newton and Descartes' laws appears here. Descartes' change in motion is brought upon
by direct  contact,  but  for  Newton any force  can bring  this  about  with  no imperative  direct
contact.  Gravity can be the cause of the object's deceleration,  not only collisions with other
bodies. Thus, while the laws of Descartes and Newton resemble each other closely, there is a
significant difference, that will have far-reaching consequences in the further development of
their theories.
92 Ibid., 60.
93 Newton, Principia, 13.
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4.3) Different Frameworks, Different Results
Following his  three laws,  Descartes  develops  his  theory regarding what  we are  most
interested in: planetary motion. In line with his two first laws, and in giving properties of planets
and stars, he comes to the key propositions: “That the heavens are fluid,” “That the heavens carry
with them all the bodies which they contain.”94 It is worth noting here that having the heavens
carry the Earth rather than the Earth moving by itself is another way out of the conflict between
Galileo and the Church, as the Earth does not move relative to the vortex and the fluid around it,
so in a certain sense Descartes can still affirm the Earth is motionless.  Little by little, Descartes
then describes his universe, made of a network of vortices of different sizes, centered at different
planets and stars, and causing the motions of all planets. This is essential, because as planets
move in circles, there must be external causes acting upon them. Within his framework, these
causes must involve direct contact with the planets, and this leads Descartes to advocate for this
mechanical vortex theory, backed by the foundations of his argument that disallow the existence
of vacuum.
On  the  other  hand,  Newton's  method  guides  him  towards  a  very  different  universe.
Newton's initial mathematical work, along with his laws of motion involving forces, lead him to
a  mathematical  description  of  orbits.  Through geometrical  proofs,  Newton shows that  for  a
planet in orbit, one simple force towards the center of rotation, proportional to the inverse of the
distance squared, would create an orbit as observed. Experimentally and mathematically, Newton
thus sees that to obtain the orbits of planets, the force of gravity suffices. Contrary to Descartes,
Newton hereby requires space to be empty, so that there is no resistance hindering the movement
of planets, which would lead their orbits to spiral down towards the center of rotation. Also,
94 Descartes, Principles, 93.
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gravity must act between the centre of rotation and the orbiting object. This may be difficult to
fathom, as it would imply action between two points separated by a certain distance. Newton
himself   struggled  with  this  idea,  notably  in  his  famous  “Queries”  in  Opticks,95 where  he
attempted to justify the possibility of this, without having to revert to an aether, or any other
system without vacuum between the planets:
Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, by which they act at a
distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflecting, refracting, and inflecting them, but also
upon one another for producing a great Part of the Phaenomena of Nature? For it's well known,
that Bodies act one upon another by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism, and Electricity; and
these instances shew the Tenor and Course of Nature, and make it not improbable but that there
may be more attractive Powers than these.”96
Newton was unsure about the direct physical causes of gravity, and this is an example of his
exploration of how this action may take place. In order to fit his mathematical model, though,
there could be no resistance in the motion of planets in their orbits, thus a vacuum in space was
required regardless of how the interaction took place. Within Newton's framework, it would be
impossible for planets to move in their orbits if there was any resistance in their motion, hence
space must be empty of any material substance. To end this chapter, I will now examine the
reasons for specific criticism of each method on both sides of the controversy, based on their
respective methods.
4.4) Some Problems with each Method
As we previously saw, though Leibniz did not agree with all that Descartes put forward,
95 Isaac Newton, Opticks (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1931), 339-405.
96 Ibid., 375-376.
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he was fundamentally a mechanical philosopher, and agreed with Descartes' approach to natural
philosophy.  On the  other  hand,  Cotes  firmly  defended Newton's  method,  and just  as  firmly
criticized that of the mechanical philosophers. It  is now evident that this very divide in their
methods  was  an  important  part  of  this  disagreement.  As  we  have  seen,  Leibniz  repeatedly
criticized Newton for his use of miracles or occult causes. However, it  is Leibniz's Cartesian
method which leads him to these conclusions. As quoted by Hall in Philosophers at War, Leibniz
in an unpublished paper said about Newton that
He who would show that the laws of astronomy can be explained on the supposition of a mutual
gravitation between the planets will have done something very worth while, even though giving
no explanation of gravity. But if having reached this fine discovery he thinks he has provided an
adequate cause so that nothing else remains to be found out, and that gravity is a thing essential to
matter, he relapses into physical barbarism and the occult qualities of the School-men.97
It  is  because  of  the  mechanical  philosophical  method  he  uses  that  Leibniz  cannot  consider
Newton's explanation complete, and that he simply does not fully understand Newton's work. In
the previous passage, Leibniz claims that Newton “thinks he has provided an adequate cause and
that  nothing  else  remains  to  be  found  out.”  However,  this  is  not  true.  Newton  repeatedly
acknowledges that he does not claim to have provided a complete explanation for gravity, merely
he  has  explained  how it  acts  quantitatively.  Cartesian  emphasis  on  the  mind,  and  his  own
framework, is very visible here in Leibniz's criticisms of Newton as they mostly have to do with
the lack of mechanical explanation. This, however, is in turn the result of Newton's own method,
because his  mathematical  groundwork rendered a mechanical  explanation in Cartesian terms
97 Hall, Philosophers at War, 154-155.
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impossible. The mathematics developed by Newton are the basis of his work, and they lead him
to the conclusion that gravity “acts on every part of a body, and even if the cause is unknown it is
non-mechanical,”98 and is proportional to mass, not surface area.99 This is very important, and an
important  problem for  Cartesians.  In  any mechanical  explanation for  the  motion of  planets,
objects move through collisions with the medium. If this is the case, surface area must be the
measure of exerted force, because the larger the surface area, the more this object would be
subject to these collisions. If gravity is proportional to mass, then it must be an attraction that
does not  act  directly on the object mechanically.  Newton cannot then,  contrarily to Leibniz,
accept any ethereal mechanical  explanation.  The difference  in  their  method was the primary
criticism Cotes gave in  his  preface to  the second edition of  Newton's  Principia,  as  we saw
previously. He may, however, be biased in his claim that any theory in mechanical philosophy is
merely  an  “ingenious  romance.”100 It  seems  that  with  his  thought  experiment  of  doubting
everything, Descartes founded a school of thought based on exploration in the mind first,  to
which Leibniz and other mechanical philosophers adhered. In contrast, Newton broke through
with a fundamentally different philosophical method, grounded in mathematics. The question
remains, however, as to why these methods could never be reconciled? Why did each of them
adopt such a different method in the first place?
98 Andrew Janiak, Newton as Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 27.
99 Ibid., 27.





To address the question of why their different methods, and the concepts that resulted
from  them,  were  never  reconciled,  I  will  introduce  Thomas  Kuhn's  notion  of
Incommensurability. My claim, here, is that the notions developed by Cartesians and Newtonians
were  incommensurable,  which  is  precisely  why  they  could  not  be  reconciled.  In  his
groundbreaking work:  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn developed a very
interesting  non-linear  structure  to  scientific  progress.  To  properly  understand
incommensurability, one must have a basic understanding of Kuhn's framework, thus, I will first
briefly  summarize  relevant  and important  parts  of  Kuhn's  theory.101 First,  according  to  him,
scientists with similar ideas belong to a “paradigm.” Within this paradigm, these scientists work
on “normal science,” in a “convergent” manner. In other words, this means that they work within
the  accepted  framework,  “puzzle  solving”  without  breaking any of  the  laws or  rules of  the
paradigm. Normal science works to make results more precise, or to derive new ideas from these
results,  but  without  breaking  apart  from  the  paradigm,  progressing  slowly  in  a  convergent
fashion.
101 Explanation of Kuhn's scientific revolutions based on:
Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) and
Sergio Sismondo, Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (Chichester, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2010).
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However, with time, “anomalies” within the paradigm will arise. By anomalies, Kuhn
means experimental results that violate accepted rules of the paradigm, and generally issues that
cannot  be solved by convergent  problem-solving.  In  an effort  to  solve  these  problems,  new
scientists  will  come forward with new hypotheses that contradict  important  ideas  within the
paradigm. Kuhn calls the ensuing period a “crisis,” when scientists will argue between the old
paradigm and new alternative theories. Eventually, consensus upon the correct solution and a
new framework arises, and a new paradigm is adopted by the scientific community, through a
“paradigm  shift.”  However  interesting,  this  scientific  revolution  framework  may  be  too
restrictive for our particular example, and attempting to perfectly align the Cartesian-Newtonian
controversy with it may prove to be counter-productive. Instead, there is one particular notion
that Kuhn introduces with his framework that will interest us: “incommensurability.”
This notion, at the heart of Kuhn's concept of paradigms, is extremely interesting and
applies very well to our controversy. Suppose that, in the manner described above, there was a
shift  from  a  paradigm  A to  a  paradigm  B.  Kuhn  describes  paradigms  A and  B  as  being
incommensurable.  This  is  the  idea  that  the  paradigms  adopt  such  different  theoretical
frameworks that more than disagreeing with each other, they will have a lot of difficulty even to
just communicate ideas from one to the other. The difference in the paradigms is so fundamental
that they constitute a difference in world view. Kuhn delves into this in the tenth chapter of his
pivotal work:
Examining the record of  past  research from the vantage  of  contemporary historiography,  the
historian of science may be tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change, the world itself
changes with them. Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new
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places. Even more important,  during revolutions scientists see new and different  things when
looking  with  familiar  instruments  in  places  they  have  looked  before.  It  is  rather  as  if  the
professional community had been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects
are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as well.102
Not only  do  scientists  look at  new problems in different  places  then,  but  they also  see  the
problems and subjects they studied before in a completely new light. The scientific community is
subject to a sweeping shift in perspective, goal, and interpretation. In fact, Kuhn explains further
that:
at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientists's perception of
his environment must be re-educated – in some familiar situation he must learn to see a new
gestalt. After he has done so the world of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable
with the one he had inhabited before.103
This  is  where  his  idea  of  incommensurability  really  appears.  The  new  paradigm  is
incommensurable with the previous one. All endeavors and research within the new paradigm
will present the characteristics described above, making communication and exchange between
the paradigms impossible, as a complete shift has occurred from one to the other. It is almost as
if the scientists in each respective paradigm are speaking a different language, and having trouble
translating it into terms that are understandable to the other paradigm. Fundamentally different,
the paradigms will never agree, and instead progress occurs by the new paradigm replacing the
other in the foreground. While the idea of paradigms is very interesting, it is controversial and
many historians of science have found it difficult to define what exactly constitutes a paradigm.
102 Kuhn, Scientific Revolutions, 111.
103 Ibid., 112.
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Here,  I  will  here  prefer  to  it  the  term  framework for  each  side  of  the  Descartes-Newton
controversy.  Similarly,  it  is  important  to  mention  that  the  notion  of  incommensurability  as
defined by Kuhn may be slightly too restrictive, and that while it is very useful and largely
applicable to our controversy, it should be taken carefully. Instead of a complete impossibility to
reconcile two frameworks, I here consider incommensurability between frameworks to be the
great difficulty to do so, and will prefer to apply it to particular instances and individuals, rather
than to the whole Cartesian-Newtonian divide. Applying these ideas to the Cartesian-Newtonian
controversy will prove to be a very useful way to understand why they could never come to an
agreement.
5.2) Applied to the Descartes-Newton Controversy
This  very  inability  to  come  to  an  agreement  or  compromise  is  in  fact  an  essential
characteristic of the arguments between Cartesians and Newtonians, particularly when it comes
to  the  phenomena  underlying  planetary  motion.  This  may  at  first  seem  to  be  a  matter  of
stubbornness  on both sides,  but  it  goes further than this,  and one can really  call  their  ideas
incommensurable, with each seemingly speaking a different language. Direct questions from one
side to the other, such as those posed by Leibniz to Clarke, are never directly answered, at least
in terms acceptable or coherent to mechanical philosophers. These questions are instead turned
around into a Newtonian perspective, and looked at from that framework. The same is also true
the other way around, with Leibniz adapting each problem to fit his own understanding. Three
particular  subjects  appear  particularly  incommensurable  within  the  controversy:  gravity,  the
nature  of  space,  and the  idea of  occult  qualities.  I  will  provide  examples  for  each of  these
subjects in the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke, because in these we see the direct
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opposition  between  them.  The  back  and  forth  between  them  itself  exemplifies  this
incommensurability, and their debate will thus supply interesting insight into this.
When discussing the nature of gravity, Leibniz asks Clarke: “What does he mean, when
he will have the sun to attract the globe of the earth through empty space? Is it God himself that
performs it?”104 In his reply, Clarke states:
That  this  phenomenon  is  not  produced  sans  moyen,  that  is  without  some  cause  capable  of
producing  such  an  effect;  is  undoubtedly  true.  Philosophers  therefore  may  search  after  and
discover that cause, if they can; be it mechanical, or not mechanical. But if they cannot discover
the cause;  is therefore  the effect  itself,  the phenomenon,  or  the matter  of  fact  discovered by
experience, […] ever less true?105
Here, Leibniz's question arises from his not only disagreeing, but also misunderstanding Clarke
on a  fundamental  level.  Leibniz  poses  a  question  that  shows he  cannot  fathom the  idea  of
attraction as a mathematical construct, because within the Cartesian framework, there can be no
such thing and a physical cause must be provided, or nothing has been explained. On the other
hand, Clarke simply does not answer Leibniz's question. Instead, Clarke restates what he has
previously said, in his own “language” of Newtonian philosophy. That is, Clarke explains that
the cause is not vital to the phenomenon being true. Instead of providing a cause, Clarke tells
Leibniz that philosophers can later on find it, but within Leibniz's framework, this will simply
mean Clarke is not answering his question at all. In general, the discussion as to the nature of
gravity on each side of the controversy reveals a complete incommensurability regarding this
issue. Cartesians and Newtonians were looking at the same data, and the same phenomena, but
104 Clarke, Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, 94.
105 Ibid., 118.
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their different perspectives led to very different approaches. Cartesians looked for direct causes
and  all  explored  mechanical  hypotheses  for  the  interaction  of  planets.  Deeply  differently,
Newtonians looked to precisely describe the interaction in mathematical terms, leading to results
that  do  not  easily  conform  with  mechanical  interaction,  at  least  of  the  sort  proposed  by
mechanical philosophers. Asking different questions, and looking differently at the same data,
their concepts of gravity were truly, at least in my sense of the word, incommensurable.
Similarly, it is very difficult to reconcile Cartesian and Newtonian ideas as to the nature
of space. Here, the difference in their perceptions is very simple: Cartesians believe space is
filled with matter, Newtonians are convinced space is void of matter. This is a very important
issue, because it is central to their respective systems of planetary motion. The Cartesian model
of the Universe relies on this subtle matter filling space to push the planets, and the Newtonian
system relies on there being nothing to hinder the motion of planets in space. These are such
central  tenants  to  their  philosophies  that  they  cannot  budge  from  their  positions.  In  their
correspondence, Leibniz and Clarke first argued using God's power and doings as arguments.
Leibniz  argues  that  the absence  of  matter in  space  implies  limitations  as  to  God's  power.106
Clarke refutes this, notably by explaining that God has power even over immaterial things. Very
interestingly, in his fifth letter  to Clarke,  Leibniz mentions a particular experiment regarding
vacuum conducted by Mr. Guerike of Magdeburg, where he pumped all the air out of a certain
container. Leibniz's Cartesian interpretation of this experiment is very different from Clarke's
Newtonian interpretation. While Clarke would agree that Guerike has pumped all the air out, and
what is left in the container is a vacuum, void of any matter, Leibniz sees things very differently:
106 Clarke, Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, in letters 1 through 4.
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The author objects against me the vacuum discovered by Mr. Guerike of Magdeburg, which is
made by pumping the air out of a receiver; and he pretends that there is truly a perfect vacuum, or
a space without matter, (at least in part,) in that receiver. The Aristotelians and Cartesians, who do
not admit a true vacuum, have said in answer to that experiment […] that there is no vacuum at all
in the tube or in the receiver; since glass has small pores, which the beams of light, the effluvia of
the load-stone, and other very thin fluids may go through. I am of their opinion: and I think the
receiver may be compared to a box full of holes in the water, having fish or other gross bodies
shut up in it; which being taken out, their place would nevertheless be filled up with water.107
This  shows how the  same experiment  can  be  looked at  very  differently  from two different
perspectives. Clarke sees vacuum in the container, but Leibniz doesn't and instead considers that
only some of the bigger pieces of matter have been taken out. Again, they are looking at this
from completely different, incommensurable frameworks.
Finally, the way in which each of them employs the term “occult” to qualify aspects of
the opposing views reveals another aspect of the deep divide in their frameworks. Cartesians
view Newtonian gravity as an occult quality. The reason for this seems to be that Newton did not
provide  a  direct  mechanical  cause  for  gravity,  and  instead  as  we  have  seen  described  it
mathematically. This was apparent the first time Leibniz employed the term in his 1712 letter to
Hartsoeker as we saw in chapter  3.1,  when he described gravity as “performed without  any
mechanism.”108 This lack of mechanism, and thus of physical cause, renders it an occult quality
in Leibniz's eyes. When Newtonians talk about occult qualities, however, they are referring to
something very different. Instead of a phenomenon without an apparent cause, it is for Newton a
phenomenon without any evidence which is qualified as occult. For example, Newton qualified
107 Ibid., 64-65.
108 Leibniz letter to Hartsoeker (1712), taken from Newton, Philosophical Writings, 112.
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Cartesian subtle fluids as occult, because there is no evidence that they exist, no experiment or
observation to prove their existence. Instead, they are the result of a philosophical framework
requiring them to exist, and are thus for Newton occult. In all, these examples are only some of
many which show the ways in which these frameworks were incommensurable, crucially to the
controversy. What were the consequences of this incommensurability? What were the underlying
causes that made these ideas incommensurable? How was this resolved? In my final chapter, I
will  address  these  questions,  diving into the heart  of  this  controversy,  and briefly  providing




6.1) The Descartes-Newton Paradox
Having opposed Cartesian and Newtonian methods and developed an understanding of
the nature of the opposition between the two in terms of incommensurability, I am in a position
to put forward a slightly paradoxical claim as to the consequences this had on the state of physics
at  the  beginning  of  the  18th century.  Then,  mechanical  and  mathematical  philosophers  held
contradicting perspectives on planetary motion; however, within the controversy, these opposing
perspectives  were  within their  own framework both  correct.  That  is,  within this  transitional
period,  even  if  these  claims  contradicted  each  other,  they  were  correct  if  one  accepted  the
founding ideas of the framework in which they appeared. Cartesian and Newtonian claims were
thus correct and impossible at the same time, depending on which framework one adopts. 
I shall first consider the Cartesian perspective. One of the most important foundational
claims within this framework is the following: there can be no action at a distance between two
objects without any intermediary. This appears repeatedly throughout the work of mechanical
philosophers, and notably in Descartes' three laws of nature from Le Monde,109 further explained
in Principles of Philosophy.110 At the beginning of the 18th century, this is a widely accepted fact,
109 Descartes, Le Monde, chapter 7.
110 Descartes, Principles, 59-62.
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and one can readily understand why, as even today our intuition tells us this should be true.
Interaction between two objects without contact or anything in between them to mediate it is
difficult to fathom, so it is not difficult to put oneself in the shoes of mechanical philosophers,
who accepted this principle as a basis of their philosophy. This has important implications, which
were developed logically and soundly within the Cartesian framework. First, there can be no
vacuum in space, as something must be present between planets so they can act upon each other.
Second, Gravity as conceived by Newton is impossible, as it would require action between two
objects without anything in between, as well as being proportional to its mass rather than its
surface area. These claims, based on the above Cartesian premise, are derived logically from a
true hypothesis, and must thus be correct within the framework. This means that along these
premises, gravity as conceived by Newton is impossible.
Now, let us consider the foundations of the Newtonian framework. As we have previously
seen, mathematical claims rather than philosophical ones are the bedrock of Newton's work. To
parallel with my argument above, let us consider a claim that was most definitely true within this
framework: In order to follow their observed trajectories, planets must only be the subject of a
force directed towards the center of their orbits. Again, following the publication of Newton's
work,  this  mathematical  fact  alone  was  vastly  accepted.  This  is  something  Newton  proved
geometrically  in  his  first  book of  the  Principia,  and it  is  most  certainly true  that  an object
exposed to such a force only would follow exactly that sort of orbit. Taking this to be true, two
claims follow logically. First, there cannot be any matter in space, because planets would then be
exposed to a second force, a resistance, that would not result in the observed orbits. Second,
without matter in space, this centripetal force acts between objects through empty space. Thus,
54
along these premises, it must be true that gravity as conceived by Newton is real, and that space
is void of any matter. This would imply that Cartesian claims of subtle fluids are impossible.
Here  we  find  ourselves  in  an  ambiguous  situation.  Accepting  Cartesian  foundational
claims  to  be  true  subtle  fluids  are  real  and  Newtonian  Gravity  impossible,  but  accepting
Newtonian foundational claims, subtle fluids are impossible and Newtonian gravity is real. At
the beginning of the 18th century, neither of the founding arguments could be said to be wrong,
yet they led to very important contradictions. Hence, truthfulness cannot be what determined
which theory was accepted, because both arguments are valid and based on premises deemed
true within their framework. Instead, it is the nature of the method used, and more fundamentally
what was considered the correct mode of explanation that determined which theory was more
adequate. These different modes of explanation point to the very core of the controversy: the
difference  in  the  nature  of  scientific  understanding,  resulting  from  different  background
assumptions within each framework.
6.2) A Scientific Controversy on the Nature of Understanding
In  order  to  better  understand  the  source  the  controversy  between  Cartesians  and
Newtonians, and why it was so difficult for each of them to come to terms with the opposition's
work,  I  will  now  look  specifically  at  what  made  it  a  scientific  controversy.  A scientific
controversy is not merely a debate or disagreement about a given subject. As with our debate, it
is instead a much deeper issue, which cannot be resolved simply by further inquiry or simple
arguments.111 Controversies  are  long-lasting  and  very  difficult  to  end,  but  what  makes  this
different to a simple disagreement? As Aristides Baltas explains in an essay about the patterns of
111 Aristides Baltas, “Classifying Scientific Controversies, ” in Scientific Controversies: Philosophical and 
Historical Perspectives, eds Aristides Baltas, Peter Machamer and Marcello Pera (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 44.
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scientific  controversies,  the  root  of  controversies  lies  in  the  scientists'  “background
assumptions.”112 These background assumptions form the basis of their theories, and are present
at  each step of their  arguments.  When two scientists  with different  background assumptions
discuss the same subject, then, their disagreement will lie deeper than just the ideas at hand, as
the opposing view not only contradicts one's results, but also the foundation of one's framework,
which is based on these assumptions.
Cartesians and Newtonians both had important background assumptions, which certainly
shaped their work and their results. As we saw through studying Descartes' method, his starting
point  was  the  certainty  of  the  existence  of  one's  mind.  Through  his  process  of  doubting,
Descartes puts forward the most important Cartesian background assumption: that for something
to be real it must have clear and distinct properties. This background assumption is the backbone
of mechanical philosophy, because it creates the Cartesian framework in which all actions are
caused by direct proximate mechanical causes. On the contrary, one fundamental background
assumption in Newton's framework is that the most important aspect and first step of scientific
investigation is the quantitative description of forces. Physical causes are within his framework
secondary, which sets this apart from Descartes completely.
These different background assumptions form the basis of the controversy, and lead to the
very difference in the nature of their explanations, shaping their very idea of what a scientific
explanation is. It is indeed these assumptions that lead Cartesians to see a scientific explanation
as  describing  the  direct  causes  of  phenomena,  and  Newtonians  to  prioritize  quantitative
description. All theories proposed by Cartesians adopted the same kind of explanation. One can
talk  about  a  specific  Cartesian  way of  explaining,  or  understanding,  planetary  motion.  This
112 Ibid., 40-49.
56
understanding  is  a  philosophical,  physical  understanding.  Cartesian  theories  deal  with  direct
causes  for  motion,  and  attempt  to  truly  understand  the  nature  of  observed  phenomena.  In
contrast, Newtonian understanding of phenomena is not as direct. Less philosophical in nature, it
does not provide direct causes, only mathematical tools and descriptions. This explanation does
have important philosophical repercussions, as we saw in previous chapters, but those are not
their primary aim. This very difference in the nature of understanding they sought explains the
difference between the Cartesian and the Newtonian methods, as well as the incommensurability
of the work in each framework. In turn, this causes the Descartes-Newton paradox which we
examined  in  the  previous  section.  In  the  end,  it  all  comes  down to  the  difference  in  their
background assumptions  about  the  nature  of  scientific  explanations,  leading to  the  scientific
controversy we have examined. To pick between one theory or another, then, it  is these very
assumptions that must be examined, but in the end, why did Newton's theory win over that of
mechanical philosophers? Although it is in itself a vast subject, which I cannot address in full, I
will finish here with a brief overview of why the Newtonian framework was eventually adopted.
6.3) Towards Newtonian Science
Intuitively, it may seem that the Cartesian approach is perhaps a better explanation. Cotes
may describe this kind of theory as an “ingenious romance,”113 based on imagined hypotheses,
but these romances are certainly full explanations, and full systems of planetary motion. This
cannot be said of the theories Cotes is defending. We have seen that many of Leibniz's criticisms
of Newton's work are along these lines, and he claims Newton has not really in fact explained
anything. In an unpublished paper Leibniz explained his stance:
113 Newton, Principia, xx.
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The fundamental principle of reasoning is, nothing is without cause . . . This Principle disposes of
all inexplicable occult qualities and other figments. For whenever authors introduce some primary
occult quality, they breach this principle. For example, if anyone posits in matter a certain primary
attractive force that is not derivable from intelligible  notions of body (namely, size, shape and
motion), and he means that by this attractive force bodies tend without any impulse towards some
body, just as some conceive gravity to signify the attraction of bodies by the bulk of the Earth, or
their enticement towards it by a certain sympathy, so that they deny that the final cause of the
effect  can be derived from the nature of bodies,  and that  the process of attraction is  beyond
explanation: he is admitting that no cause underlies the truth that a stone falls towards the Earth.114
It is certainly true that Leibniz misinterpreted Newton to some extent, however, Newton did not
provide a cause for gravity, and in that sense Leibniz's criticism is justified. That is, Leibniz's
criticism of Newton's method is correct, even if he perhaps did not fully understand Newton.
Cartesian  explanations  may  be  more  speculative  in  nature,  but  they  were  full  explanations
explaining directly what causes the motion of planets. Can the Newtonian theory that does not
give a cause for gravity truly be considered a full explanation? 
While Newton's theory may not provide a direct cause for gravity, what is the point of
these Cartesian explanations if they rely on speculation about the structure of the Universe? As
we have seen, Newtonian claims are mathematically proven. This means that they provides us
with a true understanding of gravity, in that one knows how to predict the motion of planets, and
how gravity acts quantitatively. As Rupert Hall explains in Philosophers at War, Cartesians only
considered forces to be the result of an underlying phenomenon, but Newton saw these very
forces as “real and prior, though he recognized that there might be still deeper explanations of the
114 Hall, Philosophers at War, 153.
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way the force worked.”115 Newton acknowledged that he may not be drawing the full picture, but
what is the use of a Cartesian understanding if each theory is a different set of speculations?
Philosophically, one cannot be fully satisfied with Newton's work with gravity, but in the end his
was a true explanation of gravity, as his work proved mathematically the effects gravity has on
planets and how their motion follows. In time, this is the kind of scientific knowledge that the
scientific community came to value, and accept.
The progress  towards  the  Newtonian framework was thus  the  result  of  the  scientific
community  evolving.  Newton's  objective  accuracy  and  methodological  power  were  very
important, but even they did not constitute the heart of this evolution. Instead, it is science itself
which evolved, and the field of physical astronomy which became Newtonian. This evolution
took a very long time, spanning at least one century, and requiring important confirmations of
the accuracy of the framework to be finally set in stone. Newton died in 1727, but it was not until
the 1780's, just over one hundred years after the  Principia was first published, that Newtonian
science started becoming really  established,  notably with the work of  French mathematician
Pierre-Simon Laplace. Laplace applied Newtonian physics in great detail to our solar system,
and  the  resulting  model  was  highly  accurate,  providing  great  evidence  for  the  Newtonian
framework being correct. However, there was a problem with the motions of Saturn and Jupiter
within the first system he built, which put his system into question.116 Here, the theory did not
match  the  observations  perfectly,  but  bearing  witness  to  the  evolution  of  astronomy  to  a
Newtonian framework, Laplace could not consider that  there was something wrong with the
framework, but instead that he must be missing something in his  model.  Through extremely
115 Ibid., 146.
116 Thomas Levenson, The Hunt for Vulcan (New York: Random House, 2015), 18.
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detailed mathematical work on the orbits of the two planets, Laplace “was able to announce that
he had cracked the mystery. The observed acceleration of Jupiter and deceleration of Saturn, he
said, were caused by minute changes in the strength of the gravitational attraction between the
two as their trajectories shifted.”117 This was a great success for the Newtonian framework, and a
first important confirmation that the general progress of the field in this direction was correct.
A more final consensus within the scientific community, however, came half a century
later.  By  then,  the  values  of  the  scientific  community  with  regards  to  both  mathematical
explanations,  and  empirical  and  experimental  knowledge  had  deeply  evolved  to  adopt  a
Newtonian stance, and the confirmation came through Urbain-Jean-Joseph le Verrier, a young
French mathematical astronomer. While Laplace's system was generally correct, there remained
one unresolved discrepancy with the motion of Uranus. As detailed as mathematical descriptions
and analyses of the planet's orbit got, this small divide between theory and observation could not
be resolved. As with Laplace before him, however, Le Verrier was not willing to doubt Newton's
framework. Instead of looking for a  problem with Newton's  work,  Le Verrier  looked for an
anomaly, something that had not correctly been observed,  within his framework, which would
explain this discrepancy. Using Newton's laws and Laplace's mathematics, Le Verrier came to the
following conclusion: there must be a planet beyond Uranus, that was exerting a gravitational
pull on it, accounting for the observed error. Through intricate calculations based on observation
of the orbit, Le Verrier was able to predict the position of this planet, which would perfectly
account for Uranus' orbit if Newton's laws were correct. On September 23, 1846 at the Royal
Observatory of Berlin, Johann Gottfried Galle pointed the telescope exactly where Le Verrier's
117 Ibid., 21.
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predictions would expect this mysterious hypothetical planet to be.118 Lo and behold, Galle saw
in this exact position the planet we now call Neptune, and Le Verrier's mathematical construct
became a very real, physical planet. This could be considered the moment the progress to the
Newtonian framework was complete. Using Newton's laws, a prediction as to the position of a
whole new planet proved to be correct. The values of the scientific community had evolved, and




Newton was not the first of the age of reason. He was the last of the magicians, the last of the
Babylonians and Sumerians, the last great mind which looked out on the visible and intellectual
world with the same eyes as those who began to build our intellectual inheritance rather less than
10,000 years ago.119
Newton was the spark of a scientific controversy that completely changed our conception
of the motion of planets and the way our Universe works. Further than that, this controversy
introduced a new method in natural philosophy, a different way of understanding and explaining
physical concepts. Descartes' work and that of the mechanical philosophers should not, however,
be belittled. Descartes' experiments with the mind and thought itself were fascinating, and vastly
influenced natural philosophy, enabling brilliant minds such as Huygens and Leibniz to produce
important and powerful texts. Newton himself was greatly influenced by the work of Descartes
and other Cartesians. Even if Newton worked in relative seclusion, one should not underestimate
the important influence of many mechanical philosophers on his own scientific development.
Newton famously told Robert Hooke in a letter in 1676 : “What Descartes did was a good step.
You have added much several ways […]. If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders
of giants.”120 Newton's theories did not emerge out of thin air, but rather were the result of his
brilliant outlook on the Universe, shaped by the work of many before him.
119 Keynes, Lecture for the celebration of the tercentenary of Newton's birth in 1942. Taken from:
James Newman, The World of Mathematics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956), 277.
120 Newton, letter to Hooke in 1676, retrieved from http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/
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As with  perhaps  all  revolutionary  theories,  his  theory  of  planetary  motion  was  very
heavily  criticized,  and soon after  the  Principia was  published,  the Newtonian and Cartesian
frameworks were opposed. This opposition was a fundamental one, where their own background
assumptions  caused  the  very  nature  of  their  understanding  of  science  and  the  type  of
explanations  they  proposed  to  differ.  Cartesians  and  Newtonians  then  adopted  completely
different  methods,  resulting  in  incommensurability  between  their  ideas. These  clashing
frameworks interestingly created the paradoxical  situation at  the beginning of the eighteenth
century that I described. Cartesian and Newtonian theories contradicted each other, but neither
could, within its own framework, be be claimed to be false, as they were each valid. The core of
the controversy was the difference in their background assumptions about the nature of scientific
explanations, to which all aspects of the debate can be traced back. Thus, it was not truth of
statements that could make the difference between them. Instead,  it  was an evolution in the
preferred nature of scientific explanations that caused the progress to the Newtonian framework.
The question “What is Gravity?” was never Newton's priority. Instead, “How does gravity act”
was the question that needed an answer. Reaching further than the bounds of this controversy,
Newton  caused  the  whole  scientific  community  to  evolve.  Physical  astronomy  became
mathematical. Science became Newtonian.
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